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Measurement matters: changing
penalty calculations under the hospital
acquired condition reduction program
(HACRP) cost hospitals millions
Olga A. Vsevolozhskaya1 , Karina C. Manz2 , Pierre M. Zephyr2 and Teresa M. Waters2*

Abstract
Background: Since October 2014, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has penalized 25% of U.S.
hospitals with the highest rates of hospital-acquired conditions under the Hospital Acquired Conditions Reduction
Program (HACRP). While early evaluations of the HACRP program reported cumulative reductions in hospital-acquired
conditions, more recent studies have not found a clear association between receipt of the HACRP penalty and hospital
quality of care. We posit that some of this disconnect may be driven by frequent scoring updates. The sensitivity of the
HACRP penalties to updates in the program’s scoring methodology has not been independently evaluated.
Methods: We used hospital discharge records from 14 states to evaluate the association between changes in HACRP
scoring methodology and corresponding shifts in penalty status. To isolate the impact of changes in scoring methods
over time, we used FY2018 hospital performance data to calculate total HAC scores using FY2015 through FY2018
CMS scoring methodologies.
Results: Comparing hospital penalty status based on various HACRP scoring methodologies over time, we found a
significant overlap between penalized hospitals when using FY 2015 and 2016 scoring methodologies (95%) and
between FY 2017 and 2018 methodologies (46%), but substantial differences across early vs later years. Only 15% of
hospitals were eligible for penalties across all four years. We also found significant changes in a hospital’s (relative)
ranking across the various years, indicating that shifts in penalty status were not driven by small changes in HAC
scores clustered around the penalty threshold.
Conclusions: HACRP penalties have been highly sensitive to program updates, which are generally announced after
performance periods are concluded. This disconnect between performance and penalties calls into question the
ability of the HACRP to improve patient safety as intended.
Keywords: Hospital acquired conditions reduction program (HACRP), Hospital quality, Patient safety, Quality of care,
Quality improvement, Health policy
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Background
Hospital-acquired conditions (HACs) place patients at
higher risk for future health complications and may
indicate poor hospital quality of care. Since October
2014, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS), under the Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program (HACRP), has penalized hospitals in the
worst performing quartile of HAC quality measures;
that is, hospitals with a total HAC score above the
75th percentile are subject to a one percent penalty
on their Medicare revenues, assessed when CMS pays
a claim.
Penalties assessed under HACRP are sizeable (Fig. 1).
While early evaluations of HACRP reported cumulative
reductions in hospital-acquired conditions [1, 2], more
recent studies [3–7] have not found a clear association
between receipt of the HACRP penalty and hospital quality of care. For example, recent evidence suggests that
HACRP penalized hospitals had more accreditations for
quality, offered a larger number of advanced services,
were major teaching institutions, and had better performance on other process and outcome measures [7]. Other
research found that under HACRP, CMS assigned different scores to hospitals whose performance was statistically the same and penalized 25% of hospitals regardless of
the statistical significance of the difference between their
performance and others [4].
The empirical link between HACRP penalties and hospital quality of care may be further dampened by repeated
changes to the program’s scoring methodology. The total
HAC score is a weighted sum of two domain scores.
Domain 1 is based on the Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality (AHRQ) Patient Safety Indicator 90 (PSI-90)
composite score [8]. Domain 2 is based on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) National
Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) Healthcare Associate
Infection (HAI) measures. Both Domain 1 and Domain 2
measures, as well as their individual weights in the total
HAC score, undergo annual updates to address stakeholder concerns and better align measures with policy
goals. It is possible that these repeated adjustments, while
well-intentioned, may be at least partially responsible for
the observed lack of association between penalty status
and quality of care.
As one of Medicare’s largest hospital pay-forperformance programs, HACRP is intended to support
the CMS goal of linking Medicare payments to inpatient
quality of care. Sensitivity of the HACRP penalties to
annual program updates, rather than differences in hospital performance, is especially salient given Medicare’s
planned expansion of value-based payment models. Using
Medicare hospital discharge and NHSN data for hospitals
in 14 states, and HACRP scoring methodologies for fiscal
years (FYs) 2015-2018, we examined the impact of the
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changing HACRP scoring algorithms on hospital penalty
status.

Methods
Data source and study design

Several data sources were used for this hospital-level
analysis.
First, we identified Medicare discharges in Healthcare
Cost and Utilization Project State Inpatient Databases [9]
(HCUP SIDs) for 14 states (Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
North Caroline, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Washington). These states were selected because
their discharge data contained sufficient identifying information to be connected with other hospital-level data, and
they offered sufficient volume and geographic coverage to
provide meaningful insights on the impact of the HACRP
scoring methods. Second, we used CDC NHSN standardized infection ratios (SIRs), hospital-level observedto-predicted numbers of healthcare associated infections
(HAIs), available through the Hospital Compare Data
Archive [10]. These data files included SIRs for Central Line-Associated Bloodstream Infection (CLABSI),
Catheter-Associated Urinary Tract Infection (CAUTI),
Surgical Site Infection (SSI), Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) bacteremia, and Clostridium
difficile Infection (CDI). We merged the HCUP SID measures and SIR rates with hospital-level data available
through the American Hospital Association Annual Survey of Hospitals.
Our objective was to use one set of hospital performance data and compare the assignment of penalties
across four years of the HACRP scoring methodologies.
To that end, we selected data for HACRP’s FY2018 performance evaluation period: July 2014 through September 2015 (15 months) of HCUP SID administrative data
and January 2015 through December 2016 (24 months)
of NHSN HAIs. Then, to isolate the impact of changes
in scoring methods over time, we used these FY2018
data to calculate total HAC scores using FY2015 through
FY2018 CMS scoring methodologies. We settled on this
“retrospective” comparison for several reasons. First, the
FY2018 performance evaluation period was the last one
to use International Statistical Classification of Diseases
(ICD)-9 data before the switch to ICD-10. Second, FY2018
data had enhanced present on admission (POA) reporting
compared to earlier performance evaluation periods [11].
Domain 1 measure changes

The AHRQ PSI-90 measure, used as the HACRP Domain
1 score, was designed to provide a simple and transparent metric to understand, communicate, and track
patient safety across different US hospitals [12]. PSI-90
is a weighted composite of selected component Patient
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Fig. 1 Total HACRP penalties (in millions) by fiscal year based on RAND hospital data [25] merged with total HAC scores, FYs 2015-2018

Safety Indicators (PSIs) and calculated based on hospital
administrative data (claims or discharge records). Weights
assigned to the individual PSIs that comprise PSI-90 have
changed significantly over time (Table 1).
In FYs 2015 and 2016, CMS calculated hospital-level
PSI-90 measures based on the AHRQ PSI software version
4.5a [13]. Rates of individual hospital-acquired conditions
were weighted based on their volume, using 2012 HCUP
SID all-payer discharge data for patients 18 and older
[12].This weighting approach did not necessarily reflect
corresponding harm. For example, PSI-15 was weighted
heavily because it occurred frequently; however, a minor
puncture may not have resulted in severe harm. Weighting based on volume provided hospitals an opportunity to
improve their performance by targeting frequently occurring PSIs rather than the most harmful [14, 15].
In FY 2017, PSI-90 component measure weights were
reviewed and a reweighted composite measure was calculated by CMS using the AHRQ PSI software version 5.0.1
[16]. The recalibrated software modified PSI-90 composite weights based on component PSI volumes derived
from the July 2012 - June 2014 Medicare FFS claims data,
rather than 2012 HCUP SID all-payer discharge data for
patients 18 and older (as in AHRQ PSI version 4.5a).
In FY 2018, in response to the concerns that the PSI-90
weighting scheme was based on the volume of PSIs rather
than associated harm, CMS used a new set of weights
(incorporated in the AHRQ PSI software version 6.0.2)
to calculate the HACRP Domain 1 score [17]. These new
weights incorporated volume and harm of individual PSIs
according to a severity index. Additionally, PSI-07 (central line-associated bloodstream infections) was removed
to avoid double counting of CLABSIs as a component of

PSI-90 under Domain 1 and as a separate outcome under
Domain 2.
Domain 2 measure changes

The National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN)
healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) data have been
used to construct HACRP Domain 2 scores.
In the first year of the HACRP (FY 2015) [13], Domain
2 included SIRs for Central Line-Associated Bloodstream
Infections (CLABSI) and Catheter-Associated Urinary
Tract Infection (CAUTI). Domain 2 scores were expanded
to include Surgical Site Infection (SSI) in FY 2016,
followed by Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA) bacteremia and Clostridium difficile Infection
(CDIF) in FYs 2017 and 2018 [17]. In addition, in FY
2018 Domain 2 CLABSI and CAUTI SIRs were expanded
from ICU only measures to include both ICU and ward
patients.
Changes in hACRP scoring mythology

To determine a hospital’s total HAC Score, CMS used a
decile-based scoring methodology in FY 2015, 2016, and
2017, but switched to the winsorized z-score methodology
in FY 2018.
Under the decile-based scoring methodology, each hospital received two relative ranking scores, ranging from
1 to 10, based on their Domain 1 and Domain 2 measures. A hospital’s Domain 1 score was determined solely
by their PSI-90, while their Domain 2 score was determined by reported HAI measures. Hospitals with at least
one HAI score reported to NHSN received a Domain 2
score based on the average of their reported SIRs. Hospitals without at least one reported HAI score either (a)
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Table 1 The AHRQ PSI-90 component measures, by version and
year(s), with corresponding weights

For FY 2015, CMS applied a weight of 35% for Domain
1 and 65% for Domain 2 to determine the total HAC
score; for FY 2016, this changed to 25% for Domain 1
and 75% for Domain 2. In FY 2017 and 2018 the weights
changed again: 15% for Domain 1 and 85% for Domain 2.
As noted above, if a hospital only had data for one domain
score, CMS applied 100% weight to this domain. Under
the decile-based scoring approach (FY 2015-17), a hospital’s Total HAC score represented the decile of a hospital’s
performance, ranging between 1 and 10. Under the winsorized z-score method (FY 18), total HAC scores ranged
from − 3 to + 3. In all years, hospitals with a total HAC
score above the 75th percentile of the distribution were
subject to a 1% payment reduction.

Vsevolozhskaya et al. BMC Health Services Research

AHRQ PSI-90
software version

PSI-90 individual weights/POA

Recalibrated
PSI-90
weights

4.5a (FY15-16) 5.0.1 (FY17)

6.0.2 (FY18)

Pressure Ulcer (PSI-03) 0.2303/0.0220

0.0391

0.0557

Iatrogenic
Pneumothorax
(PSI-06)

0.0545/0.0708

0.0905

0.0493

Central
Line-associated
Bloodstream
Infections (PSI-07)

0.0563/0.0652

0.0301

–

Postoperative Hip
Fracture (PSI-08)

0.0025/0.0011

0.0025

0.0093

Perioperative
Hemorrhage and
Hematoma (PSI-09)

–

–

0.0820

Postoperative Acute
Kidney Injury (PSI-10)

–

–

0.0466

Postoperative
Respiratory Failure
(PSI-11)

–

–

0.3109

Perioperative
0.2572/0.2579
Pulmonary Embolism
or Deep Vein
Thrombosis (PSI-12)

0.3570

0.1954

Postoperative Sepsis
(PSI-13)

0.0603/0.0742

0.0798

0.2318

Postoperative Wound 0.0097/0.0165
Dehiscence (PSI-14)

0.0183

0.0121

Accidental Puncture
or Laceration (PSI-15)

0.3827

0.0067

Analytic approach

0.3292/0.4917

POA is Present on
Admission indicator; if
POA available in the
data a different set of
weights was used by
the AHRQ software.

did not receive a Domain 2 score because they had a HAI
exception, and their Total HAC score was based solely on
Domain 1 performance or (b) had the Domain 2 score set
to the maximum (i.e., 10 points) [13, 16].
Unlike the decile-based approach, the winsorized zscore methodology uses continuous scores based on raw
measures (instead of the relative rank from 1 to 10). If a
hospital’s individual HAI measure falls below the 5th percentile (or above the 95th percentile), based on all eligible
hospitals reporting the measure, it is set equal to the 5th
(95th) percentile value. Then, each HAI measure is converted into a standardized z-score. If a hospital did not
submit any Domain 2 measures and did not receive a HAI
exception, the maximum winsorized z-score for Domain
2 was applied; otherwise, no Domain 2 score is calculated.

Total HAC scores for FYs 2015-2018 served as our main
study outcome [18] (Table 2).
We identified n = 1704 hospitals in 14 states for which
Domain 1 scores could be calculated and n = 1105 hospitals in those states for which at least one Domain 2
measure was reported to NHSN for the evaluation period
of interest. For each hospital, the total HAC score was calculated based on FY 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 scoring
methodologies in two different ways. First, since we did
not have information whether a hospital received the HAI
exception, we assumed that hospitals without a Domain
2 measure had the required exception and the total HAC
score was equal to the Domain 1 value. In a second
(alternative) analysis, we assumed that hospitals without
a Domain 2 measure did not have the required exception and maximum Domain 2 score was employed. Then,
a binary variable (1 = yes or 0 = no) of whether a hospital received a payment penalty under a specific scoring
methodology was assigned based on a hospital’s percentile
score within the study sample. This information was used
to assess the degree to which changes in HACRP scoring
algorithms affected hospital penalty status.
The changing scope of CLABSI and CAUTI measures employed by HACRP over the study time period
(expanded from ICUs only to ICUs plus select wards in FY
2018 scoring) also required us to predict certain ICU-only
measures not included in data publicly available through
the Hospital Compare Data Archive.
To construct Domain 2 scores under FYs 2015-2017
methodologies, we used extreme gradient boosting technique, implemented through R xgboost software package
[19], to predict FY 2016 CLABSI and CAUTI SIRs for
ICUs only. We performed a 70/30 split of the FY 2015
data to train and evaluate the model. Additional predictor
variables that were included at the hospital level included:
SIRs for ICUs and selected wards, count of staffed and
set-up hospital beds, total hospital admissions, FTE personnel at the hospital, and percent of total inpatient days
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Table 2 Measures adopted for Hospital-Acquired Conditions Reduction Program by fiscal year
Domain 1

Domain 2

Measure

FY 2015

FY 2016

FY 2017

FY 2018

PSI-90 composite
claims-based
measure







–

Recalibrated
PSI-90 composite
claims-based
measure

–

–

–



CLABSI









CAUTI









SSI-colon and
hysterectomy

–







MRSA bacteremia

–

–





CDI

–

–





Weights

Dom1: 65%

Dom1: 75%

Dom1: 85%

Dom1: 85%

Dom2: 35%

Dom2: 25%

Dom2: 15%

Dom2: 15%

covered by Medicare and Medicaid. Root mean square
error (RMSE) was used to evaluate prediction accuracy,
which was RMSE = 0.40 for CLABSI and RMSE = 0.30 for
CAUTI measures. Lastly, we predicted 2016 CLABSI and
CAUTI SIRs for ICUs only to calculate Domain 2 scores
under FYs 2015-2017 scoring methods.

Results
Total HAC scores and their summary characteristics are
provided in Additional files 1: Table A1.
A total of 1704 hospitals were assigned a total HAC
score for each fiscal year, with 426 above the 75th percentile cutoff value for penalty assessment. As noted
above, the empirical 75th percentiles for our data did not
exactly matched the CMS-reported cutoffs (Additional
files 1: Table A1). Nonetheless, total HAC score cutoffs
that were calculated under the assumption that no data
submitted to NHSN implied no Domain 2 score closely
matches CMS-reported cutoff values, while the alternative approach significantly exceeded these cutoffs. For this
reason, our main results, reflecting the assumption “no
data submitted to NHSN implied no Domain 2 score,” are
presented below, while our alternative results reflecting
the assumption “no data submitted to NHSN implies maximum Domain 2 score” are presented in Additional files 1.
Because the two approaches simply shift total HAC scores
(by adding the maximum Domain 2 value versus zero), relative rankings are not significantly changed, and the two
sets of results support the same conclusions.
Comparing hospital penalty status based on various
HACRP scoring methodologies over time, we found a significant overlap between penalized hospitals when using
FY 2015 and 2016 scoring methodologies (95%) and
between FY 2017 and 2018 methodologies (46%), but
substantial differences across early vs later years (Fig. 2;

Additional files 1: Figure A3 is a version of this figure
but with maximum Domain 2 score values assigned). In
addition, only 15% of hospitals were eligible for penalties
across all four years/scoring methodologies.
To investigate whether shifts in penalty status were due
to small changes driven by tight clustering of HAC scores
around the penalty threshold, we examined changes in
relative rankings of all hospitals (penalized or not) based
on the HACRP scoring methodology (Additional files 1:
Figures A2 and A4). Note that a tight clustering of the
HAC scores at the penalty threshold may indicate that,
depending on the scoring method, a hospital “barely made
it” above or below the penalty cut-off, and implying a relatively stable performance of the penalty algorithm. As
additional Figures A2 and A4 show, we found significant
changes in hospital (relative) ranking under FY 2016, 2017
and 2018 HACRP scoring methods, regardless of how
Domain 2 values with missing NHSN data were assigned.
These results indicate that hospital relative ranking was
driven primarily by changes in Domain 1 definition.

Discussion
In this evaluation of the Hospital-Acquired Condition
Reduction Program using Medicare discharge and NHSN
data for hospitals in 14 states, we report two main findings. First, we found substantial sensitivity of the HACRP
penalties to annual program updates. Second, changes in
hospital’s penalty status were primarily driven by changes
in the definition of Domain 1.
We found the highest overlap in penalized hospitals
between FY 2015-2016, reflecting relatively a modest
scoring change between these two years, the introduction
of SSI to Domain 2 (Fig. 2). However, when we compared
penalized hospitals between FY 2016 and 2017 scoring
methods, the overlap decreased to only 40% (n = 169 out
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Fig. 2 Percent overlap in penalized hospitals among FY 2015-2018 scoring methodologies

of 426). This decrease was completely attributable to reweighting of individual PSIs under Domain 1, because the
majority of penalized hospitals (∼ 60%) did not report any
Domain 2 measures. Similarly, the lack of overlap between
FY 2017 and 2018 penalized hospitals was also driven by
another recalibration of PSI-90.
Our findings raise important concerns about the efficacy and fairness of the HACRP program over time.
Penalty status under this program has largely been driven
by recalibrations of the PSI-90, rather than any significant differences in hospital performance. Using the same
performance data over four program years, we find that
only 15% of hospitals would have received penalties under
all scoring methods. Thus, the HACRP penalties assessed
(and publicly reported) are, at best, very unstable indicators of hospital performance, providing very little guidance to hospitals on patient safety improvement and very
little information to patients seeking to identify “safer”
hospitals. At worst, the HACRP program is assessing
penalties on a relatively random of set of hospitals and
simply providing additional financial resources to the
Medicare program. The instability of HACRP measures
is an ongoing concern. In both FY 2019 and FY 2020,
Domain 1 weights were adjusted yet again [20]. Moreover,
starting in FY 2020 both domains will be equally weighted,
and starting in FY 2021 winsorized z-scores are also going
to be weighted [20].
Unreliable performance measures also stimulate inefficiency in our healthcare system. Hospitals with high

penalties will make investments in their quality and
safety infrastructure to avoid future penalties. When these
penalties reflect vagaries of measurement rather than real
performance differences, many hospitals that are truly less
safe will under-invest in improvement, while those that are
truly safer may divert resources from other patient care
improvements simply because of the penalty. The disconnect between penalties and effective hospital investments
in quality improvement has been raised in the context of
other Medicare penalty programs [21].
Inefficient use of resources is especially concerning
for low-margin hospitals, such as those serving lowincome and vulnerable populations. Safety-net and teaching hospitals are more likely to receive HACRP penalties [15]. These financial penalties, combined with an
inability to effectively direct scarce resources to improve
safety, may further widen healthcare disparities for populations served by these hospitals. Previous research
has sounded the alarm regarding the impact of pay-forperformance penalties on health disparities [22–24]; our
work adds a new facet to this debate: the detrimental
impact of penalties on the ability of these important hospitals to effectively improve care for the patients they
serve.
Our findings provide some insights on how to improve
the HACRP program. While changes to Domain 1 and
Domain 2 scoring methods were rooted in stakeholder
feedback and program improvement, they effectively
“moved the goalposts” after performance periods were
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concluded. For maximal effectiveness, changes to the program should be communicated in manner and timeframe
that allows hospitals to make appropriate investments
in infrastructure and changes to patient care. We would
also suggest caution when considering multiple program
changes over a short period of time, as these changes
contribute to hospital uncertainty regarding penalty status and may limit their willingness to pursue particular
improvements.

Limitations
Due to data limitations, we were unable to include all hospitals subject to the HACRP program in our analyses. Our
more limited dataset focusing on 14 states implies that
the 75th percentile cutoff in our data did not necessarily
match the one used by CMS to identify hospitals subject
to a penalty. Because our goal was to explore the sensitivity of HACRP penalties to annual program updates, rather
than reproduce CMS results, this limitation is unlikely to
affect our conclusions.
Our analyses also relied on a prediction model for
CLABSI and CAUTI SIRs to calculate Domain 2 measures under CMS FY 2015-2017 methodologies. This was
also driven by data limitations. Nonetheless, the impact
of prediction error on Domain 2 measures is likely to be
minimal because FY 2015-17 penalties relied on relative
ranking rather than actual values.

Conclusion
Early evaluations of the HACRP program suggested
positive impact on hospital acquired conditions. Our
work, combined with earlier studies questioning the link
between HACRP penalties and hospital quality of care,
suggest that HACRP penalties are not reliable indicators of hospital performance, creating inefficiencies and
potentially exacerbating healthcare disparities. We recommend caution when considering further modifications
to the HACRP program to limit the randomness of penalties characterizing the program’s history.

Supplementary Information
The online version contains supplementary material available at
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-021-06108-w.
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